



As the Oceans Rise, Will Our Borders Drop?

A Thematic Analysis of the Swedish Preparedness for Climate Migration

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Abstract

Climate migration is a global phenomenon that arises as a result of climate change. This thesis discusses the emergence of climate migration and what Sweden's contingency plan is for managing external climate migration in the future. The purpose of the thesis is to investigate Sweden's preventive work against international climate migration, and then the topic of climate justice and above all Loss and Damage is discussed. The following research questions are posed: *“What contingency plan does the Swedish government have for climate migration?”* and *“What position did Sweden take at COP26 regarding climate justice?”*. The concepts of climate migration, climate justice, and Loss and Damage are used to investigate the issues. Furthermore, a document analysis is performed in combination with two semi-structured qualitative interviews to answer the questions. The document analysis is a thematic analysis of three reports carried out by the Community Preparedness Project for Increased Number of Migrants (SÖM project) which is organised by the Swedish Migration Board (Migrationsverket) and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap, MSB). The interviews were conducted with Petter Nyhlin, Coordinator at the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, and Mattias Frumerie, Sweden's Chief Negotiator at COP26. The conclusions drawn in the thesis are that Sweden has a contingency plan for general migration, but lacks a perspective that includes climate migration. Furthermore, Sweden has a joint commitment with the EU ahead of the COP26 climate summit, but the Swedish approach focuses on the urgent climate change, but also opportunities that may come as a consequence in the form of economic development and job opportunities.

Keywords: Climate change, climate migration, contingency plan, climate justice, Loss and Damage

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1. Introduction

In 2050 it is estimated that 216 million people will be migrating internally because of climate change (Clement, 2021:83). In 2020, there were 30 million people fleeing natural disasters, many of which are internal and also temporary. In 1990 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted that the “the greatest single impact of climate change could be on human migration” (Brown, 2008:13). Increasing temperatures leads to increasing frequency in extreme weather, such as floods and storms. As temperatures rise so do the sea-levels, which in turn impacts rainfall and agriculture, which can lead to migration in a more permanent nature than in natural disasters (Clement, 2021:2). During the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2015 (COP21) the Paris Agreement was agreed on as an international climate agreement to limit the impact of climate change, with the goal to hinder global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Article 2.1a in the Paris Agreement further states that the parties who joined to achieve the goal should pursue 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels (United Nations, 2015). During COP26, the most recent United Nations Climate Change Conference in 2021, the overall discussions regarded how to keep pursuing the goal of 1.5 degrees Celsius by for instance assisting developing countries with climate finance and to raise the ambition to mitigate climate change (UK Government, 2021:6).

So why is it pressing to prevent climate change? Climate change is driven by natural causes and by anthropogenic causes. Natural climate change has an impact on the environment, but according to IPCCs latest report the natural drivers haven’t had an impact since the 1850s (IPCC, 2021:SPM-6-7). Since the industrialisation of the West the anthropogenic causes have become more noticeable and also irreversible. The anthropogenic cause is primarily about the increase of greenhouse gas emissions, and then especially fossil carbon dioxide (Bogren et al., 2019:135). Loss and damage is UNFCCC’s term for losses caused by anthropogenic climate change (UNFCCC I, n.d.).

Three major factors that are anticipated to affect climate change and that influence the migration patterns are as follows (1) tropical cyclones, heavy rains and floods, (2) droughts and desertification and (3) sea-level rise. Of these three factors, the sea-level rise is irreversible and will therefore lead to permanent migration (Piguet et al., 2011:7-11), which is

confirmed in the Sixth Assessment Report by IPCC (2021) by concluding that the increasingly hotter atmosphere and hotter oceans, which are slow processes, have led to rising sea-levels (IPCC, 2021:1-38). Between 1901-2010 the sea-level has risen 19 ± 2 cm, and it is almost certainly due to anthropogenic causes (Bogren et al., 2019:170).

This thesis examines the effect climate change has on migration and what approach Sweden takes to prepare for potential future migration flows due to climate change, and how this is reflected in the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2021, COP26.

1.1. Background

Climate-induced migration is an extremely topical issue. For decades, the scientific discourse has discussed different threats to the climate. Different periods have been characterised by different dangers; in the 1970s it was clear that the rapid climate change would lead to a new ice age, while in the 1980s it was said that the climate change would lead to warming and melting of the land ice which in turn would lead to an increased sea-level of 60 to 80 metres above current level (Bogren et al., 2019:12). However, the constant factor is that the climate is changing and that the anthropogenic effects are increasing in pace (IPCC, 2021:SPM-7). Currently the greenhouse gas emissions are the biggest threat to climate change, and contribute to rising temperatures which further leads to for instance rising sea-levels (IPCC, 2021:SPM-5).

In Sweden, rising sea-levels that are pressing climate change are observed. According to the report “Sweden facing climate change - threats and opportunities” by the Swedish Commission on Climate and Vulnerability (2007) the temperatures in Sweden and Scandinavia will rise more than the global mean and the sea-levels surrounding Sweden are anticipated to rise by 0.2 metres over the next hundred years (SOU 2007:60, p. 12). Sweden works relatively well to mitigate climate change; the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) ranked Sweden to be the global leader in climate protection five years in a row, and only recently lost the leading position to Denmark. CCPI ranks the world's countries depending on their greenhouse gas emissions, renewable energy, energy use and climate policy (CCPI, 2021). *But how does the Swedish approach to mitigate climate change reflect on the current debate on climate migration?*

The refugee crisis in 2015 demonstrated that Sweden was not prepared to receive large numbers of refugees. In 2015 Sweden had the largest number of asylum seekers in the history of the country; which led the total immigration numbers in 2016 to reach record highs. The following year was still affected by immigration and finally in 2018 immigration slowed down (SCB, 2021). The main cause of the peak of immigration 2015 and 2016 was the conflict in Syria; a conflict that has been debated to be grounded in climate change (Welch, 2015). In 2016 over 163 000 people immigrated to Sweden (SCB, 2021). In an audit report from 2017 the National Audit Office (Riksrevisionen) reviewed the efficiency of the government activities responsible for the migration in 2015/2016. The conclusion in the report is that authorities' preparedness was insufficient, the Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket) had developed preparedness but not enough with other authorities within the crisis preparedness system. The authorities were also not prepared for the length, extent and complexity of the refugee crisis (RiR 2017:4). Worth noting is that fleeing from climate crises has been a legitimate ground to receive asylum in Sweden. However, since 2016 changes in legislation have removed climate change as grounds for asylum (Jakobsson, 2019:16).

1.2. Aims and Research Questions

The aim of the thesis is to investigate what different forms of preventative work there are to deal with climate migration in Sweden; whether it is in the form of a contingency plan or preventing the climate migration itself. The focus will be on how the Swedish government and authorities portray the subject of climate migration and what plans for preparation they have. The following discussion about climate justice and Loss and Damage derives from the assumption that without climate change, there wouldn't exist climate injustice and Loss and Damage, which would further mean no climate migration.

Research questions addressed in this thesis:

1. What contingency plan does the Swedish government have for climate migration?
2. What position did Sweden take at COP26 regarding climate justice?

1.3. Limitations

The thesis is limited to the Swedish government and how the authorities handle the subject of climate migration. The limitation to the Swedish government is chosen to form a better understanding of the Swedish crisis preparedness and how the national discourses are formed around it. In a milieu where the three largest parties in Sweden all express a desire to limit immigration to the country (Moderaterna, 2018:14; Socialdemokraterna, 2021; Sverigedemokraterna, 2018:7), it is relevant to discuss what impact that has on the contingency plan for potential climate migration.

The work is limited to being a document analysis of the Community Preparedness Project for Increased Number of Migrants contingency plan “Social preparedness in the event of an increased number of migrants”, in combination with two semi-structured qualitative interviews with Petter Nyhlin at the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, and Mattias Frumerie, Sweden's Chief Negotiator at COP26 in Glasgow 2021. This will then be analysed using a thematic analysis.

1.4. Thesis Outline

Following this introductory chapter is a study of how other researchers have treated the subject of climate migration. In the third part of the thesis, an explanation of the conceptual frameworks is performed where the relevant concepts for answering the research questions are examined. Those discussed are "climate migration", "climate justice" and "Loss and Damage". This is followed by part four, a method section explaining the qualitative methods used, these are document analysis and semi-structured interviews, as well as a justification of the use of thematic analysis to examine the collected material. Part five is then the results part where the collected material is presented, which is then discussed in the sixth part, the empirical analysis. Finally, the conclusions that emerged during the work are presented in the seventh part.

2. Literature Review

The literature review is divided into two sections: climate migration and climate justice, and the themes are related to previous research within the subjects. Climate migration is the topic that is most relevant to the thesis to investigate the combination of climate change and migration around the world. Then delve into climate justice, which is a current topic in the societal debate on climate change, and also one of the big points for the United Nations' latest Climate Change Conference in November 2021. Within climate justice, the concept(s) of Loss and Damage are also discussed in this section.

2.1. Climate Migration

McLeman argues in his book *Climate and Human Migration: Past Experiences, Future Challenges* (2014) that there are different types of climate migration; the first type is direct migrations that can be quickly identified as climate migration. The other type is not as distinguishable, but could be defined as a number of climate processes that in turn lead to migration (McLeman, 2014:1). Furthermore, McLeman outlines that in security circles one tends to talk about climate change as a threat multiplier. He refers to climate change as an exogenous element that affects other factors that may already exist in the system and that already threaten security in society (McLeman, 2014:213).

Research shows that individuals' decisions to migrate depend on socio-economic conditions in combination with environmental events, but also that these environmental events depend on economic, political, social, and demographic contexts. Climate factors alone cannot explain migrations, but they occur in connection with socio-economic drivers (Kakinuma et al., 2020:1-2). In West Africa, the majority of the population is dependent on the natural environment; small-scale agriculture, crop production and livestock farming. It is important to know in order to understand why climate change can have such serious consequences for people's living conditions (van der Land et al., 2018:163). van der Land et al. (2018) further argues that it is rare that migrants themselves describe the driving cause of migration as environmental causes. In addition they depict the reasons for migration in different areas; in Niger, the interviewees considered the reason for their migration was due to poverty and unemployment. While in Mali it was due to economic reasons or family reasons. In the northern parts of Ghana, better agro-ecological conditions in the host country were depicted

as a pull factor to migration. Rarely is the environment described as the push factor (van der Land et al, 2018:171).

In a slightly different manner Raikba et al. (2019) argues in their study of the risk of migration in Bangladesh that it is clear that the climate is a decisive factor for migration flows. They argue that after cyclones Sidr (2007) and Aila (2009) many people emigrated because of the failing socio-economic structures; in the form of infrastructure destroyed, property loss, poverty and death. Above all, it could be seen that drinking water was affected and salinity became a clear health problem for the population. The salt water carried by the cyclones is argued to have ruined 98% of fresh water reservoirs and the ecosystems have been destroyed. The authors further develop that coastal hazards increase the risk of mass migrations in Bangladesh, and to limit or stop these mass migrations, one needs to review socioeconomic vulnerability and the consequences of hazards (Rakiba et al., 2019:247-248).

A highly current impact of climate change is the strain on the global food systems. In connection with population growth, urbanisation, and consumer demand, there is reason to believe that climate change will affect both regional and global food suppliers. It is also reasonable to assume that those who will be affected primarily by climate change affecting food supplies are the people in low-income countries (McLeman, 2014:217, 221). McLeman also argues that different populations are exposed to climate variations depending on the region. This is then further linked to social, economic and political processes in societies that result in spatial inequalities. Where those who are poorest and least economically able to adapt are those who are most exposed, he also disclosed that the less capacity the institutional authorities have, the more adaptation depends on households and meso-level actors as communities, political parties, organisations and ethnic groups. McLeman also justifies that the households adaptation choices are strongly linked to the people's economic and social capital before the event. Which illustrates that even if those who are poorest are at greatest risk of displacement, their opportunities for migration are limited to their resources (McLeman, 2014:109).

Piguet, Pécoud and de Guchteneire (2011) address how migratory movements are a product of several factors and that environmental stress is always mixed with other causes. It can depend on economic factors, political contexts or social networks. They also reason that climate-driven migrations can also be significant if they occur in societies that already have

economic, political or social tensions, there will then be a multiplier effect. Subsequently they argue that wealthy and democratic societies are less likely to be affected by climate migration (Piguet et al., 2011:13).

Kakinuma et al. (2020) delved into how flood-induced displacement was affected by socio-economic drivers as well as the exposure to flooding. They conclude that between 2008 and 2013, flood-induced displacement was high in Africa, South / Southeast Asia, Central / South America. At the same time as it was low in Europe (Kakinuma, 2020:3). This is due to the socio-economic factors; how one gets affected by flooding is also different. In Africa, you also need to pay attention to smaller floods in comparison with many specific Asian countries where larger floods have been common for a longer time, making them a feature of everyday life. Furthermore, the authors believe that the economic development in the countries is crucial for how easily one can adapt and prevent the impacts of floods, as it depends on the cities' infrastructure and residential management (ibid).

Elin Jakobsson makes the comparison in her article *Climate Change and Migration: Policy approaches for a sustainable future* (2019) that in 2018 there were 17.2 million people displaced by climate, while there were 10.8 people displaced by violence and conflicts. She also mentions that if these people can not return to their homes, there is reason to believe that they will cross international borders (Jakobsson, 2019:9-10). Although climate migration mainly takes place within the countries, it can be expected that cross-border migration will also increase as the number of displaced people increases. However, Jakobsson emphasises that it is difficult to estimate how many will be affected by it (Jakobsson, 2019:14).

The World Bank's Groundswell report (2021) that by 2050 an estimate of 216 million people could migrate due to climate change. This includes both internal migration and external migration. It also appears in the press release from the World Bank "Climate Change Could Force 216 Million People to Migrate Within Their Own Countries by 2050" that the report that climate change affects the world's poorest the more, which also are the ones that have contributed the least to climate change (The World Bank, 2021).

The research on climate migration in Scandinavian countries is very limited, including internal migration. Kelman and Warg Næss (2019), however, contribute with their article on the indigenous Scandinavian Sami. The authors explain how climate change in the Arctic

affects the Sami's reindeer herding and thus affects their migration patterns. Kelman and Warg Næss further derive that the Sami migration flows are temporary and that the climate change in northern Scandinavia do not lead to inevitable migration. Rather, migration is also about the rights of the Sami and whether the governance regimes recognize the difficulties and opportunities that arise for the Sami in connection with climate change in the Arctic (Kelman & Warg Næss, 2019:10-11).

To sum up, climate migration rarely has simple causes, it's often a product of a complex system related to economic, social and political factors. It is also difficult to predict future migration flows partly because one cannot predict all events related to climate change, and partly because one does not know how many will be affected to the extent that they are forced to migrate.

2.2. Climate Justice

Climate justice has been a high priority during the recent United Nations Climate Change Conference 2021 (COP26). Nesmith et al. outline in their chapter “Environmental Injustice: Transformative Change Toward Justice” (2020) that climate change impacts vulnerable communities the hardest; low income countries are the most affected by toxic waste and pollution (Nesmith et al., 2020:39). Further, the authors note that the exposure to environmental toxins is disproportionate, and that those most impacted by climate change are people of colour (Nesmith et al., 2020:44). It is also concluded that environmental injustice conflicts will arise as a result of climate change affecting already vulnerable communities (Nesmith et al., 2020:46). Which leads to the ongoing debate on Loss and Damage, *who is burdened with the consequences of climate change?*

2.2.1. Loss and Damage

“Loss and damage is about justice, it’s about recognizing the poorest countries are footing the bill for a crisis they did not cause. It’s about rich countries being responsible, and providing compensation they owe.”

These words were expressed at COP26 when Gabrielle Bucher, executive director of Oxfam International, spoke at COP26 on 11 November 2021. Bucher spoke at the meeting about Loss and Damage in vulnerable countries, and then especially in countries in the Pacific

Ocean (Bucher, 2021). What is discussed about Loss and Damage during the COP meetings is very important for many countries, especially in the Global South, because geopolitics is closely linked to these meetings (Johansson, 2021).

The island nations in the Pacific Ocean are among those that are mainly affected by climate change at present. Sea-level rise is what mainly causes the major consequences of climate change. In the western part of the Pacific Ocean, it has been reported that sea-level increases 2-3 times faster than average, which has resulted in almost 0.3 metre rise since 1990. In addition, 2008, fresh water supplies and agriculture were destroyed on several islands in Micronesia (Pacific Coastal and Marine Science Centre, 2020).

During the COP26 meeting in Glasgow 2021, Loss and Damage and the financing to affected countries of climate change were discussed. Among other things, representatives from the Marshall Islands expressed the need for greater support to mitigate the Loss and Damage caused by climate change (James, 2021). But after the meeting, several countries in the Pacific Ocean have expressed disappointment that they did not get compensation funding. Aumatagi Joe Moeono-Kolio, a Pacific senior political adviser to the Fossil Fuels Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative, expressed disappointment at how nations such as the US, UK and Australia refused to support Loss and Damage funds. Above all, he expressed disappointment about neighbouring Australia's actions and described it as betrayal of responsibilities. Several other representatives from the Pacific Ocean considered the COP26 meeting as a disappointment and are dissatisfied with the softened language on coal (Jackson, 2021).

Bhowmik et al. (2021) divide Loss and Damage into economic losses and other losses; they declare that the south-western coast of Bangladesh has experienced the highest losses and damages per household because the hazards that affect them cause longer impacts on the coast. This takes place in the housing, agriculture and health sectors. Bhowmik et al. also explain that there are other losses in addition to financial in the form of, among other things, mental stress, temporary migration and permanent change in profession. Next they explain the connection between adaptation capacity and Loss and Damage, and in order to limit Loss and Damage, investments targeted at raising the adaptive capacity of households living in climate vulnerable locations are required (Bhowmik et al., 2021).

In Gambia, Sidat (2013) outlines how Loss and Damages is applicable to the drought and how the population has been affected by it. Sidat concludes that the respondents in the survey claim that the drought has affected their households and then mainly through crop failure, livestock losses and high food prices. The author also states that the respondents have applied for other professions outside agriculture to be able to make a living, but that this has not been enough (Sidat, 2013).

In conclusion, climate justice is highly prioritised on the UNFCCC's agenda in the latest COP meetings. Furthermore, Loss and Damage is a consequence of climate justice and is debated at the COP meetings whether to compensate in the form of climate financing, and in that case how.

3. Conceptual Framework

This section of the thesis will regard the conceptual framework. The concepts that will be discussed are climate migration and climate justice. Within the first section the use of the term climate migration will be defined and determined how it will be conceptualised in the rest of the text. It will also address what drives migration, who migrates and the legal discourse. Furthermore, climate justice will be analysed concerning its relevance to examine Loss and Damage.

3.1. Climate Migration

The concept of climate migration, or climate refugees, has yet to be defined; because of the difficulty to interpret the concept it has not been defined by international law (Lutchmun et al, 2021:4). According to Hastrup and Fog Olwig (2012) it is hard to separate refugees by climate change from refugees by social or economical causes. The authors also mention how migration by climate change is complex because it is rarely one-way or permanent (Hastrup & Fog Olwig, 2012:1-2). The International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) is an international non-governmental organisation that explores and provides the global displacement data and above all focuses on the internal migration, namely migration in the refugees' own countries. McLeman notes in the book *Climate and Human Migration: Past Experiences, Future Challenges* (2014) that there is no mechanism to record the number of external migrants presently; the concept is too vague (McLeman, 2014:9). *What causes can be defined as a climate actor, and how permanent does the movement have to be?*

In 2007, the International Organisation of Migration came to the working definition of climate migration that climate migrants are people who migrate from their homes due to adverse changes in the environment that can be either successive or sudden. The relocation can also be temporary or permanent, and within the country or cross-border (IOM, n.d.). But the term climate migration is debated and is mainly used in the absence of another concept. The term has primarily been criticised for implying a monocausal relationship between the environment and human mobility, but the climate is rarely a single handed cause for migration. Climate-driven migration often interacts in complex patterns with economic, political or social situations (Piguet et al., 2011:16-17). The use of "climate" in the term climate migration indicates climate change. Jakobsson (2019) discusses how the use of climate migration implicitly suggests that climate change is driven primarily by certain countries, and that these countries are more responsible for the consequences of their actions. "Migration" is the term used instead of "refugee", partly because it risks undermining the UNHCR's definition of "refugees", but also because "migration" is a word that includes both forced and planned movements (Jakobsson, 2019:11-13).

Furthermore, it is important to discuss what drives migration. Within the discourse of climate migration, there is a debate that says that migration comes from failure to adapt to climate change. This means that people tend to migrate as a last resort and that it is avoided if you have the opportunity to adapt (Piguet et al., 2011:15). However, another important argument is that migration is a form of adaptation strategy itself, it should not be seen as a last resort that must be avoided. Given the complexity of the relationship between environment and migration, it is worth noting that climate change does not always lead to displacement (Piguet et al., 2011:23). Migration and displacement are often intertwined with other factors; economic, social or political reasons. Economy and work are often interconnected causes of migration, just as displacement and conflict can be. In cases of conflict, it may depend on the political situation, but also the availability of resources such as food, water or land which is discussed in the literature review. Whatever the reason, it can lead to both temporary and permanent migrations, which in turn can be both internal and cross-border migration. In addition, migration can be planned or forced, but most often it is somewhere in between (Jakobsson, 2019:11). Climate-driven migration includes many different types of migration, it is a very broad term; these may include planned evacuations, emergency evacuations, or

forced migration due to lack of resources. Jakobsson divides migrations into sudden-onset and slow-onset, where sudden-onset is migration that takes place suddenly and unexpectedly, while slow-onset often comes gradually and is clear to see in advance (Jakobsson, 2019:10-11). Furthermore, Piguet et al. emphasise that it is not always easy to identify the differences in the causes of migration; temporary migrations can lead to permanent ones, and short-term mobility tends to lead to people being more likely to migrate for longer periods of time and on longer distance later (Piguet et al., 2011:15). Subsequently, another problem with the difficulty of defining climate migration is that it is difficult to predict future migration flows, because even if one can predict certain forms of climate change, one does not know how many of those affected will migrate and whether that migration will be temporary or permanent (Jakobsson, 2019:14).

An important socio-economic perspective is to discuss who is migrating. As previously mentioned, migration is not an automatic result of climate change, those who migrate often have the "privilege" of being able to migrate. Jakobsson discusses that in cases especially for slow-onset disasters, it is often those with the resources who can migrate from the dangerous areas. In most cases, it is the poorest and most vulnerable people who risk becoming trapped (Jakobsson, 2019:13).

To summarise, the concept of climate migration is debated and lacks a legal definition. In this thesis the following definition will be used: climate migration can be summed up to mean migration that is due to climate change, which can be sudden or slow-building, it can also be internal or cross-border. This definition is used because it covers all migration resulting from climate change, both planned and forced.

3.2. Climate Justice

In 2013, Richard Heede published his report "Tracing anthropogenic carbon dioxide and methane emissions to fossil fuel and cement producers, 1854–2010" in which he concluded that two thirds of the anthropogenic global warming emissions are caused by 90 companies, and all these 90 companies are still active (Heede, 2013). Oxfam International reported in 2020 that the richest 10 percent accounted for over half of all emissions released into the atmosphere between 1990 and 2015 (Oxfam, 2020). Similar figures were discovered by Harlan et al., (2014) when they said that the Global North, which is 15 percent of the global

population, accounted for 75 percent of the annual carbon dioxide emissions (Harlan et al., 2014:127).

Climate injustice is based on inequality, it is the poorer countries that have to bear the consequences of environmentally hazardous actions taken in richer countries.; Richer countries, commonly in the Global North, are responsible for large parts of emissions and those that cause the environmental problems (Harlan et al., 2014:127). As a result, those who have contributed the least to greenhouse gas emissions are those who already experience the greatest challenges of climate change (Lewis, 2016:207). It should be noted that the governments of the affluent states have avoided addressing the subject because reducing the use of fossil fuels risks reducing the economic growth that has produced their success (Harlan et al., 2014:127-128).

Climate justice can be divided into three parts; *responsibility*, *exposure* and *vulnerability*. Responsibility means that developing countries do not cause climate change, but the countries that must take responsibility are the affluent countries that are responsible for the large parts of greenhouse gas emissions. Exposure is about who will be exposed to the consequences of climate change (UNESCO, 2020). Finally, vulnerability is defined by countries' chances of experiencing losses or extreme events (McLeman, 2014:56). Which implies that developing countries that are affected by the consequences of change have fewer resources, and it therefore becomes more difficult for them to adapt to these climate changes. Vulnerability is thus created by social variables in relation to climate change; which means that not all people and regions have the same conditions and resources that affect their adaptability (Piguet et al., 2011:13). The rise in temperature that has taken place up to today has already led to irreversible impact that we cannot adapt to (Johansson, 2021).

When discussing climate justice, there are two different dimensions; *intra-* and *intergenerational*. It then aims to distinguish between those who live during the same era, and those who will populate the earth in the future. Just as developing countries have not currently contributed to equal proportions of greenhouse gas emissions, neither has the future population. This distinction is made to demonstrate the relationships between responsibility for past emissions, transboundary impacts and future effects (Lewis, 2016:207). To further analyse the intragenerational dimension, we look at Loss and Damage.

3.2.1. Loss and Damage

Loss and damage can be seen as a consequence of a chain of failures or inability to maintain sustainable development (Boda et al., 2021:677). There is no official definition of the term, but according to the UNFCCC, it refers to "actual or potential manifestations of climate change impacts that negatively affect human and natural systems" (UNFCCC II, n.d.). A distinction is then made between 'loss' which is seen as permanent and 'damage' which in theory is reversible (Page & Heyward, 2017:362). Loss and damage was institutionalised by the UNFCCC 2013 in the Warsaw International Mechanism (UNFCCC I, n.d.). To then also be included in Article 8 of the Paris Agreement through the sentence "the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of Loss and Damage" (United Nations, 2015).

Boda et al., (2021) describe Loss and Damage by writing that when an extreme event leads to different results in different places, we have social contexts that need to help us explain this. They further explain that the social context not only determines how vulnerable nations are, but also how well they will be able to mitigate and adapt (Boda et al., 2021:678). The authors then continue that the combination of failed effective mitigation and local adaptation is a sign of lack of sufficient sustainable development that leads to Loss and Damage (Boda et al., 2021:678-679).

Huggel et al., (2013) discusses a problem with Loss and Damage and to successfully use climate financing in their article "Loss and damage attribution". They argue that it is difficult to hold countries accountable for what previous generations have contributed to greenhouse gas emissions, and in the same way it is difficult to deduce which events can be attributed to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (Huggel et al., 2013:696).

In summary, climate justice will in this thesis be defined as different nations contributing differently to climate change, and the nations that are most affected by climate change are those that have contributed the least to them. Following, the term of Loss and Damage will be conceptualised as a way for developing countries to receive compensation for the climate change they have to endure.

4. Methodology

Since the thesis is conducted as a document analysis combined with semi-structured interviews, it derives from a qualitative research method. The document analysis and the interviews aim to answer the research questions with the help of in-depth explanations. According to Bryman (2012), qualitative methods are about emphasising meanings instead of quantification (Bryman, 2012:380). As Briks (2014) outlines in the chapter “Practical Philosophy” the ontological difference between qualitative- and quantitative research, where qualitative research is pinpointed to concern the cause of a situation instead of proof of the situation itself (Briks, 2014:21). Qualitative research can also be seen through a relativistic perspective; that social constructs influence the interpretations which leads away from the quantitative researchers aim to search for proof and facts (Briks, 2014:22). Within qualitative research the epistemology, the way to gain knowledge, is through connectivity, instead of deduction as in quantitative research (Briks, 2014:23). Since the thesis is formulated as a case study of Sweden and focuses on the authorities in Sweden, it is appropriate to use a qualitative method that does not generalise the picture. Instead the thesis goes into more depth to research the causes for climate migration and the relationship between climate migration and preparedness within the authorities for potential migration.

The thesis uses sensitising concepts, as it is difficult in qualitative research to use definitive concepts (Bryman, 2012:388). The terms used, for instance: “climate migration” are controversial and do not have a definitive explanation. Instead, a more general explanation of them is used, and I am therefore aware that my interpretation of them is relevant to point out. This correlates to the term reflexivity; to be critical of one’s relationship and involvement to what one is investigating, and how that is reflected in the process and outcome of the research (Bryman, 2012:394) (Briks, 2014:25). As the researcher of this thesis my point of view is that climate migration needs to be analysed in the organising of governmental structures.

It can be argued that qualitative research method has a lack of external reliability as it is difficult to replicate the surveys because one can not "pause" the social environment, but in this thesis I use an abductive working method because I intend to see how the relationships correlate in the social environment. The abductive working method is used to examine the interviewees' perspectives and how they perceive climate change and how it will in turn affect migration, as well as how they should proceed to meet this social change (Bryman

2012:390, 401). The purpose of the study is to investigate how the governmental strategies are affected by migration changes in the spatial setting. It is therefore not the purpose to perform an analysis that can generalise Sweden, but instead go into details of how Sweden differs and how the authorities actually act.

4.1. Methods

To answer the research questions about what Sweden's contingency plan is and how we relate it to the climate meeting COP26, I performed a document analysis and two semi-structured interviews. The document analysis is conducted on the Swedish Migration Agency's documents on changes in future migration flows, and supplemented this work with interviews with Petter Nyhlin at the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), and Mattias Frumerie, Sweden's Chief Negotiator at COP26 in Glasgow 2021. The interviews conducted therefore become primary sources for which I myself have collected the material. Thematic analysis was then used to review the information collected.

4.1.1. Document Analysis

Document analysis is about examining material that is not collected data for the research project in question (Bryman, 2012:543). In this case, I have chosen to use document analysis to answer the question “What contingency plan does the Swedish government have for climate migration?” I do this by examining documents published by the SÖM project which is a project conducted by the Swedish Migration Agency and MSB. Bryman expresses the problem with underlying social structures for document analyses; he elaborates that researchers have a tendency to search for social structures when performing document analyses. Instead, he argues that one should observe the documents as a product of their environment, that it is inter-textualised, which means that the documents should be examined as part of the context in which they arose and for the purpose they are published by (Bryman 2012:554-555). As it is difficult to predict migration and its movement patterns, it can be difficult for the SÖM project to have a complete contingency plan for different outcomes, therefore there may be a knowledge gap in the reports.

4.1.1.1. Selection of Data

The documents selected are from the Swedish Migration Agency's (Migrationsverket) website. There are three reports on community preparedness in the event of an increased number of migrants. The following three reports are selected:

- "Tasks and responsibilities of social actors in a migrant situation",
- "Information sharing and collaboration before and during a migrant situation"
- "Tasks and responsibilities of social actors in a migrant situation during heightened preparedness"

The selected documents have been related to the four criteria mentioned by Bryman (2012) to assess the quality of the documents. He then refers to authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. Authenticity means the origin of the document, if it derives from a genuine source. Credibility implies that the document is free from distortion. Representativeness refers to the type of material it is, if it is generally known information or if it is clear that it does not belong to the generally accepted discourse. Finally, the concept of meaning is discussed, which signifies that the material must be clear and understandable (Bryman, 2012:544). The selected reports meet the requirements for authenticity and meaning, as they come from an official government agency and are understandable to the reader. To examine whether it achieves credibility, I had to examine who had ordered the reports. MSB had requested the reports, and they are an authority that does not have a political agenda and can therefore be credible and representative. However, the credibility is compromised because of how polarised the debate of climate migration is. As the reports concern the tasks of social actors and the sharing of information in the event of a migration situation, they can be perceived as some type of general information, even if people may not agree with the approach politically.

4.1.2. Semi-structured Interviews

Two semi-structured interviews were also used for the thesis. According to Bryman (2012), semi-structured interviews concern having a prepared interview guide with themes and questions that you want to ask, but leaving openness for participants to answer the questions and to change the order of the questions during the interview (Bryman, 2012:471). The purpose of the interviews is for the participants to describe their perception of the issue and

explain based on their experiences. The research questions are formulated "*What contingency plan does the Swedish government have for climate migration?*" and "*How does that contingency plan correlate with Sweden's acting on the COP26?*". In the first interview with Petter Nyhlin who works at the Swedish Agency for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap, MSB), I connected it to whether Sweden has a contingency plan and what it looks like, and made an interview guide accordingly. In the second interview with Mattias Frumerie, I focus instead on the second issue to take into account his work as Chief Negotiator for Sweden at COP26 2021.

The interviews were conducted on the phone, recorded and transcribed. They were timed to be around 30 minutes each.

Bryman discusses how the author thinks ethically in interviews, one should then consider harm to participants, informed consent, invasion of privacy and if deception is involved (Bryman, 2012:135). During the interviews, I have explained the content of the thesis, the purpose of the interviews and asked for their approval to both record and use their names and job titles in the text. In addition, in order for them to feel secure in disclosing names and work, I have informed them that they may skip questions they do not want to answer, and that they may cancel the interview if they wish.

4.2. Thematic Analysis

A thematic analysis was performed to analyse the data collected. A thematic analysis categorises the information based on the focus of the research question, which should provide a basis for a theoretical understanding (Bryman 2012:580). This has been done by identifying the different themes within the interviews and reports to find the connections linking them to the conceptual terms of climate migration, climate justice, and Loss and Damage. The analysis was then focused on observing for repetition, main topics, similarities and differences between the different sources of information.

5. Results

In this section, the results come from the thematic analysis. The thematic analysis consists of the three sources from the method; the primary sources in the form of the interviews, as well as the document analysis of the three reports. The three reports concerned are: *"Tasks and responsibilities of social actors in a migrant situation"*, *"Information sharing and collaboration before and during a migrant situation"* and *"Tasks and responsibilities of social actors in a migrant situation during heightened preparedness"*. The methods are related to the stated research questions: *"What contingency plan does the Swedish government have for climate migration?"* and *"What position did Sweden take at COP26 regarding climate justice?"*.

5.1. Climate Migration

Preventive work is carried out by the Swedish Migration Agency and the community preparedness in the event of an increased number of migrants (SÖM project). The first report of the SÖM project outlines what tasks at the societal level that need to be performed in a migrant situation in peacetime. Since 2016, the Swedish Migration Agency has been the authority responsible for surveillance, which means that they have a special responsibility for planning and making preparations to streamline the management of a social disturbance. This is due to the migrant situation in 2015 (Salino I, 2021:2). The purpose of the SÖM project is to strengthen Sweden's ability to handle dramatic increases in asylum seekers and other migrants. The aim of the project is to collaborate within the area of migration before, during and after an event that has led to an increase in the number of migrants (Salino I, 2021:3). In the reports a migrant situation is defined as a social disturbance, which in turn is referred to as an event that threatens or damages society's protection values, and thus deviates from the norm. They can also be difficult to predict. Disruption of society also means that the incident cannot be handled by the ordinary organisation alone. Crisis preparedness is thus about preventing possible societal disturbances and dealing with the consequences if they occur (Salino I, 2021:8). As put in the third report of the SÖM project, as a partner country in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), there are basic requirements for civil preparedness. The basic requirements aim to improve the abilities and increase societal resilience, and one of the basic requirements is about efficient management of uncontrolled large population movements (Salino III, 2021:20).

In order to be able to deal with societal disturbances in an effective manner, Swedish authorities are required to carry out external monitoring in their crisis preparedness, in order to generate a basis for risk analyses, situation pictures and measures within the organisations (Salino I, 2021:30). The first report includes the model of early warning handled by the United Nations Office on Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), which aims to reduce social vulnerability and the risk of natural disasters. Early warning concerns performing risk analysis, external monitoring, creating status images and possibly activating crisis management and crisis management functions (Salino I, 2021:31). Despite the need for external monitoring, it is not statutory in peacetime, but the Swedish Migration Agency and the Police Authority are the authorities that primarily conduct it and analyse risks linked to irregular migration (Salino I, 2021:105).

The Swedish Agency for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (MSB) is working on the management phase, and Nyhlin explains that in his work, the cause of the crisis is of lesser importance when deciding how to manage it. MSB and Nyhlin work with communication between the authorities and to ensure that it is effective before and during a crisis. He describes the work that is carried out as an all-risk perspective, that problem solving takes place regardless of the crisis and that one prepares for every possibility.

“Why these people are forced to move; if it is a war or if there are major natural disasters related to climate - it is really, from my perspective, not important. It sounds very strange to say, but the reason is not really what we are working on. Instead we work to deal with the consequences” (Nyhlin, 2021, interview, own translation).

This is also described in the reports from the SÖM project, where it is noted that their work is also based on an all-risk perspective. The first report from the SÖM project states that instead of focusing on specific events, a good general basis for the structures and routines required to deal with societal disruption (Salino I, 2021:8). The purpose of the report is not to speculate on possible causes of societal disruption, but instead to see the consequences of such a disruption (Salino I, 2021:104). Nevertheless, according to the report, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency carried out a compilation of scenario analysis in 2015 in which they identified four main categories of risks; (1) natural events, (2) major accidents, (3) technical infrastructure and supply system disruptions, and (4) antagonistic events (Salino I, 2021:11). The course of a migrant situation can look different, it can happen quickly and without

warning, or through the course of events escalating slowly. Slow escalation is a challenge to detect because it happens gradually. It also places demands on the actors' crisis preparedness in order to be able to identify if and when the load becomes too severe. Lack of capacity in one actor affects the management of the social disturbance of other actors (Salino I, 2021:19).

Nyhlin also says that MSB works with three basic principles in crises; he explains the three principles of *responsibility*, *similarity* and *closeness*. Responsibility means that the authority that has a certain area of responsibility also has the same in a crisis. Similarity means that one should work as similarly as possible in a crisis as in everyday life, the way of working should not differ too much. Closeness is about authorities, municipalities and county administrative boards working geographically close.

In the review report published by the Swedish National Audit Office (2017), MSB was criticised for its handling of the migration crisis. Nyhlin responds by claiming that they themselves thought they had good communication, but that after the crisis they reviewed the communication and worked to ensure the effectiveness to face any future crises. The first report acknowledged the lack of communication during the migrant situation in 2015 and during the COVID-19 pandemic. There was no clear stage of communication, which led to the information not being spread to all affected actors. To avoid this, structures for information sharing are needed even before a disturbance occurs (Salino II, 2021:94). Building a national system for information sharing and early warning of irregular migration is in line with the European Commission's recommendation to set up a European Migration Contingency and Crisis Plan (Salino II, 2021:97).

Furthermore, the concept of push and pull factors are discussed both in the interview with Nyhlin and in the first and second report from the SÖM project. Nyhlin describes the process of push and pull factors:

“[...] but The Swedish Migration Agency talks about push and pull factors, their analysts. Why one is 'pushed' out and what it is that makes you go to a certain place; and pull is what 'pulls' and push is what 'pushes' then. The push factor is relevant in many different contexts whether it is climate or whether there is armed conflict or whatever it may be” (Nyhlin, 2021, interview, own translation).

The first report continues to argue how Sweden is geographically located far from the entry points for irregular migration to the EU, which means that the Swedish border is not affected to the same extent as countries at the EU's external border. Furthermore, the report argues that Sweden is historically a destination country for migration, which means that developments in and outside Europe are extremely relevant (Salino I, 2021:38). Since Sweden is historically seen as a destination country, it is a form of pull factor that attracts migrants to Sweden. When sharing information, it is necessary to think about the content of the information, it can be divided into two parts; the first part is about trends and predictions in the analysis of the surrounding world. That is, one analyses the migration historically to assess future migration movements. An analysis can be made of the underlying push factors that drive migration and how other countries handle it, and then supplemented with an analysis of which pull factors exist in Sweden and surrounding countries (Salino II, 2021:27-28). The second part is about who migrates; the number of migrants and the groups to which they belong. This is relevant because the demographics of the migrants can determine which requirements need to be met for the Swedish authorities. The listed examples are family situation, language, migration status, health and special needs (Salino II, 2021:28). To investigate irregular migration, the Swedish Migration Agency observes developments in Sweden, within and outside the EU and in third countries (countries outside the EU and EEA co-operation). They examine push and pull factors and events around the world to observe what can affect migration to Sweden (Salino II, 2021:60). The Police Authority also makes observations of the irregular migration with the help of external monitoring, and then the focus is primarily on movements at Sweden's and the EU's borders (Salino II, 2021:62). In order to prevent disturbances to society, authorities, regions and municipalities must periodically carry out risk and vulnerability analysis to identify threats and vulnerabilities within their areas of responsibility (Salino I, 2021:10).

Another notable point made in the first report is how the report asserts shortcomings in communication between parties, both civil and authorities. This is based on observations of previous disruptions (Salino I, 2021:16). They also report that the preparations for the crisis were not prepared for the length and complexity of the migrant situation in 2015. In the state authorities' risk and vulnerability analysis from 2013 and 2014, MSB was also able to state that migration had not been taken into account (Salino I, 2021:20).

The second report of the SÖM project presents the importance of information sharing and collaboration between the societal actors affected by a migrant situation, and how they can be improved. The report explains that migration to Sweden in the long run is impossible to predict. However, there are, among other things, three important factors to consider when anticipating future migration to Sweden; socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, developments in conflict areas and how climate change affects migration patterns (Salino II, 2021:3). The SÖM project also reports that migration movements to the EU and Sweden have decreased partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the restrictions that followed, and partly due to the EU and the Member States' increased border surveillance and controls (Salino II, 2021:12). The austerity policy, enacted in 2016, has meant reduced asylum migration. And as a result EU member states have adopted its national asylum reception systems to a significantly lower number of asylum seekers. For Sweden this means that the Swedish Migration Agency has lower registration capacity and a decreased stock of temporary housing in the local councils. Prior to the migration situation in 2015, Sweden had built up a gradual registration and housing capacity to handle migration, today these resources are declining and Sweden no longer has the capacity to handle a migration situation where a large number of migrants seek asylum within a shorter period (Salino II, 2021:41). In a forecast for the years 2021-2024, the Swedish Migration Agency assessed that Sweden would not experience any major increase in asylum migration. But even if there are no indicators for a future migration situation, as in 2015, the report states that affected societal actors need to be prepared for it (Salino II, 2021:41).

As in the previous report, UNDRR's early warning model is discussed as a system for countries to protect their populations from external threats. The report also notes that today there is no system for early warning of irregular migration both in Sweden and within the EU (Salino II, 2021:32).

Another aspect worth noting is that Mattias Frumerie, Sweden's Chief Negotiator at COP26, avoided discussing the definition of climate migration and the need for a legal definition.

5.2. Climate Justice

Mattias Frumerie worked during COP26, the most recent climate meeting, as Chief Negotiator for Sweden and said in the interview that based on expectations, they got good

foundations at the climate meeting to work on. But he also says that there is still too low a level of ambition in the global climate work.

The third report of the SÖM project explains which tasks at the societal level need to be performed in a migrant situation at heightened preparedness. The report aims to account for who has a statutory responsibility for which tasks, and which tasks do not have a main responsible actor. The report must also serve as a basis for handling a migrant situation during heightened preparedness (Salino III, 2021:5). The report also states that the ability to deal with social disturbances in war or danger of war is to have a basis for it in peacetime. It is also worth noting that there is no obvious boundary between peace and war in complex threats (Salino III, 2021:20), unlike the clear boundary that exists in existing regulations (Salino III, 2021:22). There is also a discussion of civil defence in the event of hybrid threats; events of incidents in the grey zone (Salino III, 2021:21). It is therefore relevant to note that neither report addresses factors that can affect migration both in peacetime, but also possibly be a contributing factor to conflicts, more than in bypass. Instead they mention two different scenarios for conflict that might lead to migration as large appendices *"Europe's eastern border fails"* and *"Changed security situation around the Baltic Sea"*.

To further interpret the results from the thematic analyses of climate justice, Loss and Damage is applied.

5.2.1. Loss and Damage

In the interview with Petter Nyhlin, he explains that there are two different phases in the planning of preparedness for future crises. It is divided into *prevention-* and *management phases*. Preventive work is what reduces the risks of the crisis occurring or building infrastructure that can withstand the crises. The management phase is defined by handling the crisis once it arises. As he puts it in the interview, the prevention phase in migration is to hinder climate change before it leads to it, or to build infrastructure that can withstand it.

“Prevention is linked to the climate, it is simply a matter of stopping carbon dioxide emissions - both in Sweden and globally. Then there is prevention. You can say that you, to a certain extent, have to build infrastructure that supports a changed climate” (Nyhlin, 2021, interview, own translation).

Loss and damage can be viewed as a part of the prevention phase; to avoid further damages in future potential climate disasters.

Frumerie describes that Sweden submits a joint commitment with the EU prior to the climate summit, and that Sweden's task then is to ensure that the EU submits as generous a commitment as possible. He further emphasises the words *urgency* and *opportunities* as two important points for Sweden during COP26. He believes that climate work is urgent and that nations must do it faster, but also that it is important to highlight the opportunities that arise. Frumerie describes how, for example, the Swedish Pavilion at COP26 is a collaboration with Swedish companies and their contribution to climate work; a way to find solutions for the rapid transition in the form of economic development, new jobs and to create new conditions.

“Then the more general messages we brought to the COP, not least with the Prime Minister's participation, can be summarised in "urgency" and "opportunities". So on one hand point out the urgency of climate work, then that we must do faster, but also that we highlight the possibilities. It is a result of the companies' contributions, the type of solutions that we bring from our perspective, Swedish companies, can offer a way to speed up the transition in different countries. Everything from transport solutions and energy solutions, to things like urban planning and waste planning” (Frumerie, 2021, interview, own translation).

In response to the question about the perceived disappointment from the meeting of countries from, among others, the Pacific Ocean, Frumerie answers that the climate financing to the developing countries has not been sufficient, that the donor collective have not contributed sufficient volumes and that there is a general disappointment about this. But he also mentions that developing countries have a certain responsibility in conducting a dialogue on this themselves.

"[...] our starting point in climate financing is that the developing countries' own needs are the basis for what we are to deliver, but then it is also about the developing countries having to highlight it in their dialogue with the donors" (Frumerie, 2021, interview, own translation).

Frumerie goes on to say that he believes in a solution that does not have a top-down approach, but that developing countries must have a discussion about what their expectations

are as well. But he acknowledges the frustration regarding the phasing out of coal where he mentions how countries such as India and China led a resistance to completely phase out coal at the speed needed.

“One sees when large emitters are not prepared to phase out coal at the required speed, then that means, as some said, that "two degrees is a death sentence for us". It has such consequences for their conditions to be able to continue living in the forms they have today” (Frumerie, 2021, interview, own translation).

6. Empirical Analysis

6.1. Climate Migration

Climate migration as a subject within the contingency plans is difficult to find. Petter Nyhlin from MSB discusses in the interview with him how the work at MSB takes place from an all-risk perspective. The reason for the preparedness plays less of a role in his work, instead it is the consequences and the actions after that are important (Nyhlin, 2021). The same method of working from an all-risk perspective is confirmed by the SÖM project (Salino I, 2021:8). However, the SÖM project's reports then proceed to make more in-depth analysis of potential threats such as “Europe's eastern border fails” and “Changed security situation around the Baltic Sea” (Salino I, 2021:(1)7; Salino III, 2021:60). In my opinion, climate migration is relevant to discuss as a scenario in peacetime. The reports of the SÖM project discuss the importance of conducting analysis of the surrounding world in order to create understanding and gather information about possible societal disturbances. The Swedish Migration Agency and the Police Authority are responsible for this in Sweden, and the report only states that a forecast has been made for the years 2021-2024, with the justification that migration movements further into the future are more difficult to determine (Salino I, 2021:105). There is therefore a lack of an analysis for the future, and also an analysis that includes the risk of migration caused by climate change. The Paris Agreement states that by 2030 the world's emissions should be halved, and thus there is a period until 2030 where we can predict how climate change will affect nations and contribute to climate migration. It is therefore important for The Swedish Migration Agency and the Police Authority to include this in an external analysis. This could be implemented when carrying out an external analysis with the model for “early warning” as the one handled by the UNDRR, which is argued for in the first report from the SÖM project.

The term “climate migration” is not mentioned in the reports and Mattias Frumerie, Sweden's chief negotiator at COP26, avoids answering questions on the subject during the interview with him (Frumerie, 2021). This can be explained by Lutchmun et al. (2021), as the concept of climate migration is not legally defined. Further, Hastrup and Fog Olwig (2012) outline that it is because migration due to the climate is difficult to distinguish from other forms of migration. Jakobsson (2019) also discusses that climate migration as a term is politically sensitive. That was reaffirmed by the debates during COP26, and this becomes even more noticeable when Frumerie avoids discussing the concept of climate migration and its definition and need for legal meaning. At the same time, however, he emphasises the importance of integrating the climate into different political areas (Frumerie, 2021). On this basis, it would, in my opinion, be relevant to invest additional resources to implement a legal meaning for the concept in order to both be able to make a detailed plan for climate migration, but also to be able to get climate financing through climate meetings in the future.

In both the second report and the interview with Nyhlin, it is of great importance to observe push and pull factors in an external analysis, where push factors are the reasons that make migrants leave their current homes, and pull factors deal with why Sweden could be a country of destination (Nyhlin, 2021; Salino II, 2021:27-28). van der Land et al. (2018) discussed in their article that the environment was rarely described as a push factor, but that in Ghana better agro-ecological conditions were argued to be a pull factor. Kakinuma et al. (2020) also suggests that the climate can rarely be distinguished as a driving factor for migration, but should be seen in combination with the economic, political, social and demographic context. Furthermore, Kakinuma et al. reflect on how the risk of flooding affects different countries in different ways. In countries that do not have a strong infrastructure they do not have the same resilience to flooding, and therefore economically developed countries are better at adapting and mitigating flooding. In a similar sense, McLeman (2014) discusses that climate change can be a “threat multiplier”, as Pigué et al. (2011) argue that environment is one of several factors that lead to migration. This constitutes that although climate migration is difficult to distinguish as a single factor, in my point of view it is therefore absolutely relevant to discuss as a contributing factor to migration.

Raikba et al. (2019) explain that climate change can be a decisive factor for migration, especially at sudden-onset events such as the cyclones they address in their analysis. It is

equally important to discuss slow-onset events that can affect climate migration, such as McLeman (2014) discussing that climate change can affect food supplies in the long term. As I see it, the Swedish contingency plan lacks a discussion of the slow- and sudden-onsets of climate change which could be included in an external analysis.

In the reports of the SÖM project, it is also worth noting that only cross-border migration is discussed, but as Kelman and Warg Næss (2019) mention in their article, there is reason to discuss internal migration within Sweden or between Scandinavian countries as an aspect of changes in migration patterns. The movement patterns of the native Scandinavians, the Sami, are also relevant to discuss when arguing about migration, and from what I can see, that is lacking. They may not constitute a larger part of the total migration, but are relevant to keep in mind when thinking about migration that increases gradually.

Piguet et al. (2011) also argued that migration is often seen as a last resort, but that it should instead be seen as a form of adaptation strategy. This is, in my opinion, relevant to reflect on in an external analysis; when working for a preventive purpose, it is reasonable to consider why migrants move and whether in that case it will be internal migration or cross-border migration, which may depend on the reason for the migration. The reports from the SÖM project does not include an analysis of the cause of the migrant situation, which leads to failing to examine what can be done at an earlier stage. As Jakobsson (2019) discusses, it can be difficult to define migration; it is usually somewhere between internal and cross-border, somewhere between planned and forced. Following, as Piguet et al. (2019) further discuss, temporary migrations can lead to permanent ones, and those who have already migrated short-term, are more likely to migrate longer. Therefore, as I see it, it is absolutely relevant for the Swedish Migration Agency and the Police Authority to include an analysis of why people migrate in an external analysis, and keep in mind when discussing how migration can be stepped up gradually.

While Nyhlin in his interview states that communication via MSB is more efficient and that information sharing should go faster, the reports declare that the resources required to cope with a large climate migration similar in scope to the one in 2015 does not exist (Nyhlin, 2021)(Salino II, 2021:41). As worded by Jakobsson (2019), it is difficult to predict how many will migrate due to climate migration, but she does conclude that the number of migrants will increase. This correlates with what The World Bank claims in the Groundswell report (2021);

large numbers of people will migrate and the number will increase. Jakobsson also goes on to say that it can be expected that cross-border migration will also increase then. As such, it is interesting to read in the reports that the resilience that Sweden has had with resources and structures that existed in 2015, no longer exists to handle any large migration flows. In my opinion we should reallocate resources to develop the contingency plans to include climate migration.

6.2. Climate Justice

When discussing climate justice it is relevant to also discuss who is affected by it. Jakobsson (2019) addresses that those who have the opportunity to migrate are often socio-economically privileged from the poorer countries that are affected by climate change. It is the poorest and most vulnerable people who risk becoming trapped (Jakobsson, 2019:13). In the interview, Frumerie discusses how he understands the frustration that comes from developing countries that are affected by climate change, he also puts extra emphasis on the wording "two degrees is a death sentence for us". What he cites is a statement made by developing countries during COP26 (Frumerie, 2021). As the donor collective has promised 100 billion dollars a year from 2020 but has not maintained it, there is a risk that climate financing for Loss and Damage will not be enough. Climate finance is important for developing countries to withstand the effects of climate injustice, and by extension withstand climate migration. Thus, we must ensure that climate finance is maintained and that the goal of 1.5 degrees is not surpassed.

6.2.1. Loss and Damage

Researchers agree that the Global North has contributed to the majority of carbon dioxide emissions (Harlan et al., 2014:127; Heede, 2013; Oxfam, 2020). Harlan et al. (2014) also further expand on the subject that it is the developing countries that suffer from the consequences that come from the emissions emitted by the richer countries. During COP26, this has been a debated topic and Mattias Frumerie answers in my interview with him that in the discussion about Loss and Damage, there is disappointment among developing countries that the donor collective has not contributed with the finances promised already in 2009. During COP26, Gabrielle Bucher also expressed disappointment with the West and in her speech put pressure on the rich countries to compensate poorer nations for consequences due to climate change. Further, Frumerie also pointed out that the developing countries

themselves must highlight their needs in the dialogue in order for the donor collective to be able to deliver. He also asserts that in the conversation about Loss and Damage, the phasing out of coal is relevant because it accelerates climate change and makes it more difficult to achieve the goal of 1.5 degrees. He also believes that the frustration from developing countries comes primarily from the fact that countries such as China and India led a resistance to the phasing out of coal. Harlan et al. (2014) also note that it is difficult to implement the phasing out of coal, or fossil fuels in general, because it risks reducing the economic success of the richer countries. I believe that the argument Frumerie makes, that the developing countries need to define their needs, is relevant to justify how much one should be able to contribute, but it should not affect the donor countries' obligation to contribute funds. Since it was decided in 2009 that the donor countries would contribute 100 billion dollars per year from 2020, the climate financing for the developing countries should already be in place.

In the interview with Petter Nyhlin, the splitting between prevention and management phases was discussed. He depicted the work that MSB carries out as part of the management phase, how to act when migrants come to Sweden, i.e. what the contingency plan is about. At the same time, he revealed that some employees at MSB work on site with international initiatives (Nyhlin, 2021), which can be seen as a form of management to prevent climate migration on the ground. The work carried out on climate justice and Loss and Damage can be categorised as part of the preventive phase as a way to prevent possible climate migration if climate change continues. Also worth pointing out is how climate justice can be divided into three parts; responsibility, exposure and vulnerability. In order for climate financing to start as part of the management phase, the rich countries need to take responsibility for the greenhouse gas emissions they have contributed. During COP26 and especially in the speech performed by Bucher (2021), it is clarified that the developing countries are the most exposed to climate change. An example previously discussed in the thesis is the drought in Gambia by Sidat (2013), it is an example of how the poor countries are exposed to Loss and Damage due to climate change caused by other countries, which affects the inhabitants of Gambia through crop failure and high food prices (Sidat, 2013). In order to prevent climate migration and to deal with climate justice, one needs to realise the rich countries' responsibility for the consequences that the developing countries are exposed to. I believe that vulnerability is worth discussing in an external analysis by the Swedish Migration Agency and the Swedish Police Authority to conclude which countries are at risk of climate change, and thus would require climate financing, in order to decrease the chances of climate migration. As Lewis

(2016) addresses, both an intra- and intergenerational aspect is relevant to the external analysis. To analyse whether Sweden will be affected by climate migration, it is relevant to consider who is affected by climate justice and how we can work preventively and deal with both injustices in different parts of the world and against other generations. To return to the discussion of Huggel et al. (2013) it is difficult to make demands on countries for how previous generations have acted, but we must take responsibility for how current generations act. Even though it is a relevant argument, Heede (2013) notes that the 90 companies responsible for two thirds of the anthropogenic global warming emissions still exist, and in my opinion this means that we should be able to put pressure on the ones responsible to participate in compensation for the affected countries.

Boda et al. (2021) discusses how an extreme event has a different impact on society it affects depending on the social context. This means that it is also relevant to include in a global analysis which countries are affected directly by climate change. In a preventive work it is necessary to build sustainable infrastructures in developing countries so they can be able to adapt and mitigate if one wants to avoid climate change leading to climate migration. Looking at what Bhowmik et al. (2021) wrote about Loss and Damage in Bangladesh they acknowledge different types of losses; financial and others. In southwestern Bangladesh, people had experienced great economic losses in the form of, such as but not limited to, destroyed households and agriculture, but also other losses such as mental stress and migration. The authors believe this could be prevented by building better adaptive capacity. With that in mind, I think Sweden needs to put pressure in climate meetings such as COP26 and the negotiations in the EU to contribute to climate financing both to prevent climate change, but also contribute to adaptation and mitigation to prevent climate migration.

During the interview with Frumerie, it emerged that there are low levels of ambition for global climate work, and that it must be a higher priority on the agenda for climate meetings. Sweden's position at COP26 is largely due to the negotiations that have taken place previously within the EU, as a joint commitment is being submitted with the EU. But Frumerie also adds that the Swedish attitude is about "urgency" and "opportunities". He acknowledges that climate work is urgent, but that there are also opportunities in the form of new energy solutions and transport solutions for Swedish companies, that can lead to economic development and new job opportunities (Frumerie, 2021).

7. Conclusion

At the beginning of the thesis, the following research questions were posed:

1. What contingency plan does the Swedish government have for climate migration?
2. What position did Sweden take at COP26 regarding climate justice?

Through the document analyses of the SÖM project's reports in combination with the interview with Petter Nyhlin, Coordinator at the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, we can conclude that Sweden has a contingency plan for general migration, but not specifically about climate migration. The plans also state that they are drawn up from an all-risk perspective, where the reasons for the migration are not essential for the design of the plan. The SÖM project has nevertheless been based on three different scenarios: social disturbance in peacetime, "Europe's eastern border fails" and "Changed security situation around the Baltic Sea". It also appears from my collected sources that climate migration is a controversial concept that is politicised and therefore lacks a legal definition. This is further emphasised in the interview with Sweden's Chief Negotiator at COP26, Mattias Frumerie, when he avoids answering questions about the concept of climate migration. Within the thesis I came to the conclusion that it would be appropriate to include climate migration in an analysis of the surrounding world as a factor for potential migration for the responsible authorities; the Swedish Migration Board and the Swedish Police Authority. Furthermore, the reports state that Sweden no longer has the resources to cope with a migration situation like the one in 2015. Which indicates that we need to redistribute our resources in the contingency plan and the system we have for migration.

As a conclusion to the second research question, Frumerie states that there has been disappointment from developing countries to the donor collective for not contributing to the climate finances promised as early as 2009. He further develops that the Swedish commitment at the climate summit is prepared together in EU cooperation and that therefore have a joint commitment. However, he expresses that the Swedish approach at the meetings has revolved around "urgency" and "opportunities"; that climate change is urgent, but that these climate changes also lead to opportunities in the form of new energy solutions and transport solutions for Swedish companies, which can lead to economic development and new job opportunities.

The aim of the thesis was to investigate what different forms of prevention work there is to deal with climate migration in Sweden; whether it is in the form of a contingency plan or preventing the climate migration itself. To sum up, climate migration is not an isolated phenomenon, it interacts with other, social, economic and political factors. It develops mainly in areas that are already affected by underdevelopment and therefore need to be treated in correlation with the other factors. Through the research questions I have answered this, but I can observe development opportunities for further research by developing the concept of "climate migration" and to give it legal definition; in order to help those currently seeking refuge due to climate change. Even if it is debated, there needs to be a legal, and global, definition to further help migrants that are already exposed.

Climate migration is an important topic, it is high on the agenda at climate meetings such as COP26 in connection with the discussion on climate finance. It is time for countries like Sweden to stand up and take responsibility for the nations that are exposed to the climate change that we have been involved in and contributed to. While we reach our 1.5 degree goal, we must help those who are already forced to leave their homes today due to climate change. We must stand up for those who cannot themselves - yesterday, today and tomorrow, for our planet.

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9. Appendix

9.1. Original Quotes

“Sen varför de här människorna tvingas röra på sig; om det är ett krig eller om det är stora naturkatastrofer som är relaterade till klimat - det är egentligen, ur mitt perspektiv, inte viktigt. Det låter jättekonstigt att säga, men orsaken är inte riktigt vad vi jobbar med. Utan vi jobbar med att hantera konsekvenserna” (Nyhlin, 2021).

“[...] men Migrationsverket pratar om push och pull faktorer, deras analytiker. Varför man “knuffas” ut och vad det är som gör att man tar sig till en viss plats; och pull är vad som “drar” och push är vad som “knuffar” då. Push faktorn är ju relevant i många olika sammanhang om det nu är klimat eller om det är väpnad konflikt eller vad det nu kan vara” (Nyhlin, 2021).

“Förebyggande finns ju just kopplat till klimatet, det handlar ju om att få stopp på utsläppet av koldioxid helt enkelt - både i Sverige och globalt. Sen så finns det förebyggande i viss mån kan man ju säga om att man måste bygga infrastruktur som pallar ett förändrat klimat” (Nyhlin, 2021).

“Sen så de mer övergripande budskapen vi hade med oss till COP:en, inte minst med statsministerns medverkan, kan man sammanfatta i “brådska” och “möjligheter”. Så att ena sidan då påtala brådskan i klimatarbetet, då att man måste göra mer snabbare, men också att vi lyfter fram möjligheterna. Det kommer tillbaka från företagens bidrag, den typen av lösningar som vi från vårt perspektiv, svenska bolag, kan erbjuda för att kunna snabba på omställningen i olika länder. Allt ifrån transportlösningar och energilösningar, till även sånt som stadsplanering och avfallsplanering” (Frumerie, 2021).

“[...] så är ju vår utgångspunkt i klimatfinansieringen att det är utvecklingsländernas egna behov som är grunden för vad vi ska leverera för något, då handlar det också om att utvecklingsländerna måste lyfta fram det i sin dialog med givarna” (Frumerie, 2021).

“Man ser då när stora utsläppare inte är beredda att fasa ut kol i den hastigheten som krävs, så innebär ju det, som några sa, att “två grader är en dödsdom för oss”. Det får sådana konsekvenser för deras förutsättningar att kunna fortsätta leva under de former de har idag” (Frumerie, 2021).

9.2. Interview Guide I: Petter Nyhlin

Petter Nyhlin: Coordinator at the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB).

Fråga: *Vad du arbetar med? Hur länge har du arbetat där?*

Fråga: *Hur arbetar MSB med klimatförändringar i allmänhet och klimatmigration mer specifikt?*

Fråga: *Ser man till den globala klimatmigrationen, så leder klimatförändringar till att människors rörelsemönster förändras. Vad har Sverige för beredskapsplan för ökat antal migranter?*

Följdfråga: *Hur har man kommit fram till denna plan?*

Följdfråga: *Vad skiljer denna plan från hur man arbetade med det under de ökade migrationsströmmarna 2015/2016?*

Följdfråga: *Riksrevisionen gav 2017 ut en granskningsrapport om hur regeringen, Migrationsverket, Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap, samt länsstyrelserna agerade under flyktingkrisen 2015. Har man tagit hänsyn till denna när man skapat den nya beredskapsplanen?*

Fråga: *Finns det något i beredskapsplanen som säger att Sverige borde agera för att förhindra dessa scenarion?*

Fråga: *Påverkar klimatomöten, som COP26, beredskapsplanen? Hur i så fall, och varför?*

Fråga: *Klimatmigration skulle även kunna uppstå inom Sverige, där låglänta delar svämmas över - vilken beredskap finns idag för detta? Har man någon beredskap för intern migrationen? (exempelvis Kristianstad ligger under havsvattennivån)*

Följdfråga: *Migrationen inom landet kan öka, skiljer man intern migration till internationell migration?*

Fråga: *I denna beredskapsplan som finns, har de politiska partierna något inflytande till det? Tillvägagångssättet, påverkas det av vilka partier som sitter vid makten?*

Följdfråga: *Vilka andra underlag än politiska har använts för att komma fram till beredskapsplanen?*

Fråga: *Man kan argumentera för att Sverige inte kommer att vara första landet som flyktingar kommer att komma till, och kanske inte heller är målet för flyktingar. Men med tanke på att en höjning av medeltemperaturen på 2 grader kommer att påverka medelhavsländerna kraftigt, så är det möjligt att vi kommer att få se klimatmigration inom EU. Hur bör man förhålla sig till detta?*

9.3. Interview Guide II: Mattias Frumerie

Mattias Frumerie: Sweden's Chief Negotiator, ahead of COP26 in Glasgow.

Fråga: *Vad arbetar du med? Hur kommer det sig att du blev chefsförhandlare på COP26? Vad gör en chefsförhandlare?*

Fråga: *Hur tyckte du det gick på COP26, gick det som förväntat? Vad hade du velat få ut mer av det?*

Fråga: *På vilket sätt visade Sverige sin ställning under COP26 i Glasgow?*

Fråga: *Efter mötena i Glasgow har länder i Stilla Havet klagat på resultatet, samtidigt som stora nationer inte har velat stödja Loss and Damage, vad tror du att det kan bero på? Hur ställer sig Sverige till detta?*

Följdfråga: *Hur hade Sverige kunnat hantera det annorlunda?*

Fråga: *Skiljer man på klimatfinansiering och att stödja Loss and Damage?*

Följdfråga: *Om man skiljer på det, stödjer Sverige Loss and Damage?
Borde Sverige stödja det?*

Fråga: *Vad var Sveriges största utmaning på COP26?*

Fråga: *Det finns idag ingen definition på klimatomigrant; kan du se att det behövs och i så fall vad tror du skulle krävas för att man ska kunna enas om en definition?*

Fråga: *Sverige har enligt Migrationsverket en beredskapsplan för förändringar i migrationsströmmar. Om man tänker på klimatomigration, är det tillräckligt eller behövs det mer arbete för att förhindra det innan det går så långt?*

Följdfråga: *Vad för typ av arbete hade behövts i så fall?*

Fråga: *Hur påverkar det politiska styret Sveriges ställning på COP26? Gör det någon skillnad vilka politiska partier som sitter vid makten?*

Följdfråga: *Vilka andra underlag än politiska har använts för att komma fram till Sveriges ställning under COP26?*

Fråga: *Alla länder har påverkat klimatomförändringarna olika mycket, borde Sverige ta ansvar vid eventuella efterföljder som klimatommigration, och gör vi det?*

Följdfråga: *Har Sverige något skydd för klimatommigranter? Som exempelvis asylrättsliga skydd.*

Om nej: hur skulle man kunna implementera ett skydd?

Om ja: hur motiverades det?